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EP 06 The Democrats and Big Tech with Lily Geismer

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In this episode, Sage, Julius, and Hanna hear from political historian Lily Geismer about the Democratic Party’s decades-long relationship to the tech industry. From the Atari Democrats of the 1970s to Al Gore's dinner-party pipeline with Silicon Valley executives, Lily explains how market-based thinking gradually replaced the social safety net as the party's organizing logic. Lily digs into what that ideological shift produced: derulation that allowed companies like Amazon, Google, and Meta to consolidate into the monopolies we know today. Lily breaks down what that consolidation actually costs the average American — in jobs, in prices, and in access to information — and why the promise that deregulation would help consumers largely never materialized. Her solutions include the enduring case for government regulation and supporting public media.


Key Takeaways from Lily:

1. Big Tech monopolies were built, not born.

2. Doing well and doing good are not the same thing. 

3. Democracy needs a public sector, in media not just in politics. 


Find out more about:


Lily’s Media Diet:

This podcast is part of CAPT’s efforts to encourage open and diverse intellectual exchange. The ideas presented by individuals on the podcast are their own and do not represent Purdue University, which adheres to a policy of institutional neutrality.

We would love to hear your thoughts on this episode! Send us feedback to captivatedpod@gmail.com


In this episode, Sage, Julius, and Hanna hear from political historian Lily Geismer of about the Democratic Party’s decades-long relationship to the tech industry. From the Atari Democrats of the 1970s to Al Gore's dinner-party pipeline with Silicon Valley executives, Lily explains how market-based thinking gradually replaced the social safety net as the party's organizing logic. Lily digs into what that ideological shift produced: derulation that allowed companies like Amazon, Google, and Meta to consolidate into the monopolies we know today. Lily breaks down what that consolidation actually costs the average American — in jobs, in prices, and in access to information — and why the promise that deregulation would help consumers largely never materialized. Her solutions include the enduring case for government regulation and supporting public media.


Key Takeaways from Lily:

1. Big Tech monopolies were built, not born.

The consolidation we see today was the result of deliberate policy choices. Democrats believed deregulation would spur competition and benefit consumers. It didn't. But if policy decisions created this mess, policy decisions can undo it.

2. Doing well and doing good are not the same thing. 

The New Democrats believed that a rising tech tide would lift all boats. But economic growth at the top doesn't automatically create equity at the bottom. When the market is the mechanism, the people who own the market win.

3. Democracy needs a public sector, in media not just in politics. 

NPR, PBS, local journalism are important infrastructure for an informed citizenry. Supporting them financially and as an audience is a democratic act.


Find out more about:


Lily’s Media Diet:


Transcript:

[00:00:00] Lily Geismer: 

Increasingly, it's about actual personal ties. So in the Clinton years, actually, Al Gore, who has a longstanding commitment to tech, developed really, really close ties with the leading figures in Silicon Valley. And so in the second term of the Clinton administration, he was having monthly meetings where he was bringing in major tech figures to have dinner with him and talk about big ideas. So they're actually getting policy ideas and able to influence policy in various ways.

[00:00:34] Hanna Sistek: 

Welcome to another episode of CAPTivated, a podcast hosted by the Center for American Political History, Media, and Technology at Purdue University. In each episode, we examine a specific facet of our digital public sphere, how it works, and how we got here. We're here to help you sort through the noise. I'm Hannah.

[00:00:51] Sage Goodwin: 

I'm Sage.

[00:00:52] Julius Freeman: 

And I'm Julius.

[00:00:53] Sage Goodwin: 

On today's episode, we're sharing our conversation with history Professor Lily Geismer. Lily researches and teaches at Claremont Mechanic College outside of Los Angeles. She focuses on modern US history, liberalism, and the Democratic Party. She has written two books alongside public writing for places like The New York Times, the Washington Post, and The New Republic.

[00:01:13] Julius Freeman: 

Her scholarship is about the transformation of the Democratic Party and how it shifted away from its blue-collar roots toward being a coalition of professionals and tech elites. 

[00:01:23] Hanna Sistek: 

I found that part of the conversation really interesting, particularly when she talked about how the evolving door between industry and government developed.

[00:01:31] Sage Goodwin: 

Yeah. And Lily also talked about tech deregulation. In the 1990s, it was championed by Democrats who thought it would promote competition and benefit consumers, but actually, it just created massive monopolies like Amazon, Google, and Meta. 

[00:01:43] Julius Freeman: 

Throughout the conversation, Lily explained how these shifts toward deregulation have led to severe consequences for the average American, like job losses, the monopolization of information by those same tech billionaires, and rising prices, where we have to now take out a loan to buy eggs.

[00:01:58] Hanna Sistek: 

So we began by asking Lily about the relationship between the Democratic Party and big tech.

[00:02:04] Lily Geismer: 

I'm not an overwhelmingly tech-oriented person. I always say I can barely turn my computer on and have to even get my nine-year-old to help me with various things. But the big questions that have interested me are these larger shifts that have happened in the Democratic Party. As the party has shifted from being a more urban, industrial-based party and union with a lot of union density to being a more suburban, professional-oriented party, the first book that I wrote, which is called Don't blame us suburban liberals. And the transformation of the Democratic Party is a case study of the Route 1 28 area outside of Boston. So it's looking at these five Boston suburbs that were really shaped by the sort of tech industry in various different ways. So they're an industry that primarily spins off from MIT and Cold War defense spending. And then, so that kind of research and the arena of research and development, then, is really what spawns kind of the emergence of the high-tech industry. So looking at those, these kinds of engineers. And their politics led me to larger questions around tech and then also particularly to thinking about how the relationship with the tech industry, both in terms of tech workers, but also tech as an economic tool of growth, comes to fundamentally define the Democratic party.

From the period really starting in the fifties, but especially in the seventies and beyond. And so it's something that I started working on in my first book, but then it is also a major theme in my second project, Left Behind, where I look at the Democratic party, especially during the kind of Clinton era, in the embrace of market-based solutions to solve inequality, and tech is a key piece of that project.

[00:03:52] Sage Goodwin: 

And can you tell us a little bit more about how the relationship between the Democratic party and the tech industry, the fusion between those kinds of logics and ways of thinking? How has that relationship played out? 

[00:04:06] Lily Geismer: 

Yeah. So one of the things is this commitment to entrepreneurial-based growth, but some of the things are like a kind of generational shift that happens. The Democratic Party started in the 1970s. And so in the seventies, there was a huge economic recession and crisis. And some of it is a kind of crisis of the sen economic model.

[00:04:24] Sage Goodwin: 

Can you just unpack that a little bit further? 

[00:04:25] Lily Geismer: 

That's kind of what the linchpin of really like liberalism in the 20th century was, which is this idea of government spending to stimulate the economy. And it's a consumer. The model is heavily based on manufacturing. And it breaks down in the 1970s. And so democrats and then also like economists are looking for other types of solutions and see the solution to these problems of deindustrialization in tech, essentially.

And so it really starts in the seventies of a group of Democrats who were first called the Watergate babies, and then became known as the Atari Democrats, who are pushing the importance of the Democrats really investing in tech.

And so some of it actually is like they want government spending, but mostly through subsidies and tax credits to go to the tech industry to grow. And that will be really important to the nation's future. 

[00:05:10] Sage Goodwin: 

I really like how you spelled it out and left behind the sort of new Democrats and the Clinton administration's idea of doing well by doing good, whereas FDR liberalism was doing well and doing good, and that being a shift from one to the other.

[00:05:24] Lily Geismer: 

Yeah. So I mean, so in some ways, I guess, fallacy or assumptions like Democrats have long supported economic growth, there was a really important importance of like growing the economy and then having what's known as a compensatory welfare state.

So welfare supports what's happening, like filling in the gaps. And so that's separating them. What happens amongst the new Democrats is that they really believe that the market can do good. So if you do that, economic growth or these tools of the economy, and if it's tech that can help everybody.

So actually, you don't need a social safety net, you don't need compensatory welfare because the market can do those kinds of things. And so the idea is either to grow the market or to integrate. Pour people into the market or bring the market to them?

[00:06:06] Hanna Sistek: 

So I was like curious then, if the Democrats got all in bed with big tech, how does that compare to the relationship between the Democratic Party and technology companies? How's that different from the relationship between the Republican Party and technology companies? 

[00:06:23] Lily Geismer: 

I think it's some of the ways that the Democrats sell this or make it so important to their project. And so one of the ideas of this is like, traditionally we think of Republicans as the party of big business and Democrats as the party of the working man, and there to solve social equality.

But one of the things through tech you can see is the ways that. Shifts. And so Democrats have long had business relationships, but I think it comes into really sharp focus where they're prioritizing that over their connections to helping working people by creating these tight ties with the tech industry. This will help everybody. I think the other thing, even though tech as an industry is not partisan or particularly ideologically focused, there was an idea amongst Democrats that this tech as an industry was more aligned with their particular values.

So one of the things about the tech industry, and this is especially in the seventies and then onward, is that it eventually becomes this, but not focused on as defense spending, it's not heavy weaponry. Another huge part of it is ostensibly much more environmentally sensitive than manufacturing, so this was helpful. It's with the larger goals of the economy. And then also, it believes that one of the core things that I look at in my research is that Democrats are really interested in questions of opportunity and meritocracy, and tech is traditionally a very meritocratic industry.

So if you like the smartest people. Do the best. It rewards that. And so that falls in line with these other logics of the Democratic Party. And it's, it's seen as very future-oriented. So it's not tied to the past. It's very much future-oriented. It's one of Bill Clinton's favorite phrases, like that he's building a bridge to the 21st century. And tech is the critical part of that bridge. 

[00:07:59] Sage Goodwin: 

And can you tell us a little bit more about what that actually looks like? The relationship between big tech and the new Democrats, between Bill Clinton and some of these people. Hannah uses the phrase in bed with big tech, but what does that actually look like? 

[00:08:12] Lily Geismer: 

Sure. It can go in a couple of ways, and there's the question of policy versus politics. So initially, I mean, it's so, so there's a part of platforms and statements saying we want to give subsidies to grow this industry. And we see this as the space of the future. Another is starting to see many more Democrats looking to Silicon Valley and others. Tech-oriented sectors are spaces for actually getting campaign donations from them. So, going there for donations. And then increasingly it's about actual personal ties. So in the Clinton years, it's actually Al Gore who has a longstanding commitment to tech, who develops really, really close ties.

With the leading figures in Silicon Valley. And so in the second term of the Clinton administration, he was having monthly meetings where he was bringing in major tech figures to have dinner with him and talk about big ideas. So they're actually getting policy ideas and able to influence policy in various ways.

I mean, if you just go through the roles of who's going to the White House during the second Clinton administration, it's a lot of tech figures who are there giving talks. They're promoting different things. So that's kind of, I would say, like a symbolic, like being in bed with them. I mean, they're part of the same kind of milieu to some degree, and that solidifies these types of bonds.

[00:09:25] Sage Goodwin: 

So that famous image of the second Trump inauguration that was going around of the kind of people that were there, the Jeff Bezos, the Mark Zuckerberg, et cetera, I think a lot of people found it quite jarring, potentially, but that's actually not that different from what was happening during the Clinton administration. 

[00:09:41] Lily Geismer: 

Yeah, I mean, I think there, like, there were also members of the leading Tech Silicon Valley figures who were at the Clintons' second inauguration, if you look at, like, Obama was constantly in Silicon Valley, holding meetings at Facebook during both of his terms. So no, I don't think that's necessarily a new thing. I mean, I think that was, I guess, striking for their literal position on the dais. Like, which I think nothing had been seen like that.

I also think that stands for the cultural shift of the tech industry in American culture. 2025, when that was like the nineties, where there was a much more sort of sense of tech is a good thing.

And this faith in these various companies. And I think that has shifted. So, I think 5, 10, 10 years ago. I remember my nephew wrote a thing where he had to ask about a Great American, and he wrote about Elon Musk.

I don't, I guess there are kids, maybe there are kids who are still doing that, but not that many. So I think there's been a shift in the cultural attitudes towards those things. I guess I'll give my, but my kids see those trucks and freak out 

[00:10:40] Sage Goodwin: 

The cyber trucks.

[00:10:41] Lily Geismer: 

I think there's been a rapid shift, and I thought those trucks were made for who they should be a feeling to. It's because eight-year-olds are their primary audience. So, I do think there's been a larger shift. And that's also what the image on the DAAs represents. 

[00:10:54] Julius Freeman: 

And so, thinking about this moment of deregulation that we're in, what do you think the problem for the broader public is with deregulation? What does that mean for the average American when this is happening? 

[00:11:06] Lily Geismer: 

Yeah, and so I would say one of the things that I write about and have spoken about in other places is that, especially during the Clinton era, there was a lot of deregulation of tech, and their idea is that competition is good for the American consumer. If things are deregulated, then the market will correct. And also, there was a real faith in the internet. I mean, when you look at the early days of the internet, this is producing certain knowledge, so therefore we shouldn't be regulating its content. It's against civil liberties in various ways. And that sets up a particular infrastructure around how tech is oriented. So one of the things is that there was a lot of faith in self-regulation. So, as the industry should self-regulate, and then we should trust them, that poses a certain challenge to actually doing regulation later.

So, during the Clinton years, I think it must have been the FTCI, I have to remember in my mind, but it had a suit against Microsoft for being a monopoly. So there was this effort, and those charges dissipate in various ways. And Bill Gates reinvents the sort of philanthropic image of himself. But I think that there's been a longstanding effort, like the questions of regulating these companies have been really difficult, especially when these policies have played a role in actually producing them. The Biden administration did actually try to do substantial regulation of the tech industry. Both around issues of monopolies.

So these big suits against Google and Amazon, and then also around AI issues, were trying to put in place certain regulations, and those were clearly unpopular amongst tech. Figures. And so we start to see this shift away from that, I think that's the other symbol for.

So one of the things that's important is the Democrats are trying to believe in this, have this faith in growth as the mechanism for the future, but so do these tech companies; what they're invested in is the growth of their own companies.  And that was really the main ethos of most of them. So the way to do that is potentially through these other relationships. So, as we've seen in the last year, the Trump administration has not aggressively been going after any of these companies on issues of antitrust violations, and also, Trump repealed most of the AI regulations. So I think it has played a major role, too. 

[00:13:11] Hanna Sistek: 

So, what does this mean, then, that we don't have strong regulation of tech, and actually, it's self-regulating.

[00:13:19] Lily Geismer: 

What does that create? I mean, in one way, it creates monopolies for the companies. So you allow Amazon, and I think this is not just a question for Joe on the street in terms of our content, but also in terms of our jobs. I mean, to me, you can pick the company that you wanna focus on. There are large-scale questions around the fact that the lack of regulation has allowed Amazon to grow exponentially, and now it is planning to have 75% of its operations workforce be automated. That matters. I mean, from a labor perspective, it's allowing those practices to happen without any government involvement or government oversight or regulation. I think there are huge actual questions around content or what we consume. And so the other disturbing thing is how these tech figures also control the media that we consume in various ways.

But that can go to both in terms of social media, which is one area, but actually legacy media too. And so in the last week, watching what's happened to the Washington Post, which is another question when you allow the kinds of monopoly that have happened, I mean, it's affected these other ideas of running legacy media, like it's a tech company, has had its own implications, where we're now actually losing a lot of content. I mean, so not having a sports section or a local section of The Washington Post is very troubling to the average person. And, I think that that's one example of a place that would happen, but that is gonna have cascading effects. 

[00:14:42] Julius Freeman: 

Yeah, it sounds like that, and you tell me where I'm wrong when I restate all of this, is that there's a problem with these companies basically consolidating power. Amongst each other, and just a few companies running everything. And as they begin to do that, they begin to venture into other sectors and take over those as well. Kind of not only monopolizing their area, but also monopolizing the economy and, in part, also pushing out the average worker and trying to maintain as much profit for themselves.

So, like for the average American, they're losing jobs, they're losing resources, but they're also losing access to information, to content, to knowledge, all in the pursuit of this deregulation that really doesn't serve the average American, but really only serves the company. 

[00:15:28] Lily Geismer: 

Absolutely. That was a very astute and eloquent way of restating it. So I think you can think about those questions in a couple of different ways. The other thing is crowding out. And this goes to the question of entrepreneurship, it's also crowding out like startups.

So there's this idea like, a lot of the Democrats traditionally supported startups, but that's not actually what ended up that's not where the growth happened. It's actually hurting small businesses. One of the arguments that the Clinton era made is that this is good for the American consumer because you're getting more information exponentially, which brings down prices. The cost of goods. But that has not happened. And I think the issue, too, is that not thinking about this from a labor perspective also has really severe implications. Because even if the cost of goods is down. Like 'cause Amazon's allowed to be a monopoly, which by the way actually is driving prices up, not downward. If people don't have jobs to buy goods, it doesn't really do people that much good. So I think that's part of the problem too.

[00:16:20] Julius Freeman: 

Yeah, and so I think now that we've clearly kind of laid out the problem here, I think it would be a good place to transition, because we don't wanna just sit here and just talk about the problems. It would be good to hear from your perspective some of the solutions that you have. So, in terms of thinking of your work, are there any solutions to this problem that we're facing?

[00:16:39] Lily Geismer: 

It's a challenging moment right now to think about, given some of these things. But I think it's actually to go back to the power of the government. And we've seen the government be so challenged and threatened and actually hollowed out in the last year.

But actually looking back to these mechanisms, there are laws in place to regulate, so that's one place, but also to actually make the federal government, in some ways, the only force that has the power to stop big corporations, which goes back to the early 20th century. Like why we have enforcement in the first place, and to the New Deal as well. So I think that's a huge place for thinking about those questions. I think from an information perspective, it's trying to find more localized or other mechanisms to produce information.

So, I think that there's an interesting question, in some way, that information can fill in the voids that some of this has caused. I actually think, like, I'm not an expert in it by any means, but the Substack model is super fascinating, and that's actually a tech-based solution. But that has enabled a lot of these journalists who have lost their jobs to still produce information. So, that's one of the reasons I think in the first place, places like the Washington Post are actually in crisis and responding in the ways they are, but I do think that, as ways of finding alternative means to produce information, they have a lot of potential for podcasts.

[00:17:51] Julius Freeman: 

So we're part of the solution. 

[00:17:52] Lily Geismer: 

Yes. 

[00:17:53] Sage Goodwin: 

Yeah. I think it's also really interesting thinking about the place of the market versus public goods, to me, underlying a lot of the work that. You've been doing it, it seems to be making the case that even just straightforwardly, like regulation is not necessarily the answer. It's thinking about how the government thinks about the relationship between the market and playing an active role in reducing social inequality, and that kind of thing. 

[00:18:24] Lily Geismer: 

Yeah. I mean, I think there's a question of what its purpose is, and this goes back to the core of what defines. The 20th-century Democratic Party or liberalism is the idea of using the federal government to solve problems of inequality. I mean, that's like, that is like what the New Deal was. And that's what its purpose was going forward through, 

In some ways, what the Clinton-era Democrats thought they were doing was using the market as the mechanism to do that. So I think going back to those ideas is really, really important. I think beyond the question, just with tech, our media, but it's that we've watched the federal government has lost. I think it's a wake-up call to be like, those are actually the ones who are there to work for the public good. If that's the larger goal, I think that we've watched as our public sector has become so denuded, and it's really important to bring that back.

And that goes to the same question as with the importance of the media. And having this controlled by private corporations has its own implications that you're not actually producing the public conversation or public sector, which often can come from having these non-monopoly-controlled sources of media.

[00:19:27] Julius Freeman: 

And so, thinking about this, do you have any interventions that you heard of or that you find intriguing that might be beneficial in terms of making a change on this problem? 

[00:19:37] Lily Geismer: 

I think one of the things that's important is looking at NPR and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. As I was saying while we were walking over here, I am the daughter of a PBS producer. PBS was a critical source for so many people; it was actually a quite democratic idea when you only had three channels. For many children of the seventies, eighties, and beyond, that is where they got their education, myself included, learning my ABCs from Sesame Street.

I think of this with my own kids, too; by that point, it was on HBO, but they don't have that anymore. While I’m not suggesting we have government-controlled media sources, I do think there is value in understanding these as public goods and recognizing the importance of having those kinds of spaces.

One of the bigger questions is how we take the profit orientation out of media production. I think that is the issue with a place like The Washington Post. Instead of focusing on providing critical knowledge to the public, it became a profit-oriented institution, and that is where the downfall lies. We need to find ways to get beyond those profit-oriented motives. Sometimes that does require government support, because that is where you can exist without the constant need to generate a profit.

[00:20:52] Sage Goodwin: 

So one of the things that you could do, I guess, as an individual, is to support a lot more of that kind of public media.

[00:20:59] Lily Geismer: 

Lily Geismer

Yeah, absolutely. That’s a key thing for all of us to be doing in a lot of different ways. I’m not just saying go give money to your local NPR station, which you should do anyway, but you should also be listening and looking to those kinds of places.

I think local stations are vital, too. One of the huge issues we face is the decline in local media, and we really need to think about ways to regenerate that. I usually talk much more about politics than I do about media, so this is refreshing for me, but I make the same argument about politics: right now is the moment to get involved in local politics. It really matters, and it’s a place where you can make a huge difference. I think local media follows that same idea. They are innovating to make the barrier to entry much lower than it used to be, which creates a real possibility.

However, I think one of the problems that arises is proliferation. Things have become so fragmented that people are paralyzed by choice. I always try to explain this to my students regarding TV; the idea of having only four stations is foreign now. There is just so much out there that I think it is actually producing its own crisis and set of problems.

[00:22:01] Hanna Sistek: 

I think so too. I grew up in Sweden, and in Sweden, the media is seen as something that's really important for our democracy. So we, you know, help fund it through tax money. And that's how we found public service, radio and TV, and also we help support local newspapers, which otherwise would not exist, just because it is a democratic issue. So I'm always blown away when I'm listening to the radio here, and it's ads all the time. We never hear ads on our public service radio. And actually, one way that they support that is if you buy a radio or a television set, you then need to pay a specific tax that goes to produce programming, so that's one way. 

[00:22:51] Lily Geismer: 

Well, I think that would be great. They always do that on the radio. I think about that with how much I listen to NPR, and it's, you know, even less than a cup of coffee. But, I think one of the things that's really challenging about this that always comes up to me is how little of the federal budget is actually spent on media. Is or would be. And so it's been on the chopping block for years. But it is so valuable to have a functioning democracy. But how devalued it is. But it's such a time. This has been a bigger question with things like Doge, but those are low-hanging fruit, and actually don't impact the scope of the federal budget. So, we should look to Sweden.

[00:23:30] Hanna Sistek: 

Yeah. But sadly, we have a far-right party that is not the second-largest party. In the government and, yeah, uh, media support is one of the things that have been on the chopping block there, too.

[00:23:41] Julius Freeman: 

So this is sadly something we see globally. Um, absolutely being attacked. Yeah. And I, as well, with deregulation, I think that's happening all over the world. And so that brings us to the point where it would be good to hear from you based on this conversation and kind of what you've been thinking about, for our audience, what are some key takeaways that they should walk away with? If they like, “Hey, these are the key points you need to be thinking about.” 

[00:24:05] Lily Geismer: 

Well, I think one is to understand that there’s a key evolution. Regarding that question around issues of deregulation, certain choices were made to make that possible. I mean, having these huge corporations is not a natural thing; it was allowed to happen for various reasons. Some of it was done with good intent. It’s not to say it was all nefarious, but there were good intentions behind it in some ways, like wanting to have economic growth. It was just economic growth at the top, which didn’t actually create equity. So, I do think the question of the power of regulation is really important, and I know it’s not the hottest issue, but it is a really important one.

Two, we need to think about both issues of equality and democracy, and about finding an alternative. Mechanisms such as these are possible through the choices we make as individuals, but also through the pressure we put on our officials and policymakers to push for these things going forward.

[00:25:01] Julius Freeman: 

No, I think you've explained it really well. For me, I always hear that deregulation is a good thing because of more money, more profits, and more jobs—all that stuff. But you've explained the benefit and the importance of regulation in a way that makes it clear even to me, someone who probably should know more about it. It made sense to me: the importance and the necessity of regulation for the betterment of everyone.

[00:25:28] Lily Geismer: 

Well, I'm glad. Regulation matters, though there is a point where it can go too far. That’s one of the problems: sometimes overregulation can actually harm certain forms of growth, so it has to be monitored.

But I think this is a particular sector that has been allowed to grow and be deregulated for a number of reasons. One thing I think is especially important is that the idea of deregulation was supposed to actually stop monopolies, but that rarely happens. All we've seen is consolidation.

Actually, I will say, I didn't talk about this, but the corollary policy in the Clinton years is the Telecommunications Act. That was also supposed to be a deregulatory tool. The idea was, "We’re going to have competition everywhere, we’re going to break up these companies, and they can all just do everything." Instead, what you saw by the early 2000s was the consolidation of five media corporations that basically came to control everything. That is just not good for the economy, and it’s not good for the average person.

[00:26:28] Sage Goodwin: 

Yeah, I think we can all agree on that. 

[00:26:30] Julius Freeman: 

Yeah. So, what we always try to ask before we end our conversations with our guests is this: with all this craziness happening around us, we want to hear about your "media diet." What do you engage with to figure out what's happening in the world? We try to break it down in terms of your "meat and veg". What do you go to consistently?

[00:26:56] Lily Geismer: 

I'm still a New York Times reader. That is core for me; I consistently go to the New York Times.

[00:27:04] Sage Goodwin: 

Are you a physical copy reader?

[00:27:06] Lily Geismer: 

I get the Sunday New York Times, which I like, but I think I get it mostly aspirationally because it just sits in a pile. I tell myself, "One day I’ll sit down and read the hard copy."

I will say, there was a period where I got it every day, and you see tons of stuff that you wouldn’t see otherwise. When you read digitally, you read so selectively that I don’t think you see everything on the page. When I read the print copy, I see all kinds of things. It’s the same when doing historical research. When I was researching my first book, a lot of it involved the Boston Globe. It wasn’t keyword-searchable, so I’d read the whole paper, and I started to see all kinds of connections that I would have missed if I had just done a keyword search.

I am also really committed to The New Yorker; I love it and try to read it every week. I sometimes skip articles that aren't totally

[00:27:55] Sage Goodwin: 

What are your favorite parts of The New Yorker?

[00:27:56] Lily Geismer: 

I like a lot of the human stories, and I think they do really good political coverage of various issues. I always find interesting things. I think it makes you a bit of a jerk at parties, though, because you’ve read one article and then you're like, "Oh, you're a scientist? I read this one article about that specific topic, so now I'm an expert on your field!"

I love the deep dives. Those are my consistent ones. I live about 40 minutes from where I work, so I'm in the car a lot. I listen to NPR, and my go-to podcasts are The Daily, so I’m boring in that way, and The Ezra Klein Show. My New York Times loyalty is really coming out here! I also love the show The Dig, but it’s really long; that’s like a two-hour investigation that feels like it takes a long time.

For news, I’m a kind of voyeuristic Twitter and Blue Sky person. I wasn't an early adopter, so it doesn't always make sense to me; I feel like the people who caught on early understand it better than I do. But I get a lot of suggestions from people. My mom is constantly sending me stuff, and my husband sends me articles. I used to be much better at looking at every news source, and now this is making me feel guilty about my "fasting." I used to find The Washington Post great, but I’ve stopped reading that. I try to read the LA Times too, because I live in LA and I've lived here long enough that I should be reading it. The LA Times has really good coverage.

We also have a local source, I live on the east side of LA called The Eastsider, but that’s very niche and specific. I love long-form podcasts, and I just listened to a really good one, though I’m totally blanking on the name, about the death of a labor activist. I’ll have to get that name for you. I know from talking to friends who work in podcast production that those are really expensive to make, so they’ve stopped making as many of those "big" ones. There’s one called The Big Dig about the infrastructure project in Boston that I’m obsessed with. I’d recommend everyone listen to that.

[00:30:04] Sage Goodwin: 

I used to get confused between The Big Dig and The Dig. I’d see it on the show and think, "Everyone is really interested in this infrastructure project in Boston; I don’t understand why!"

[00:30:14] Lily Geismer: 

Well, I just gave you more to do, so you can go read The Dig and listen to The Big Dig. They are different!

I also love TV; that’s probably my more escapist side.

[00:30:23] Sage Goodwin: 

Okay, well, tell us about the "guilty pleasures." Tell us about your junk food, your guilty pleasures. 

[00:30:29] Lily Geismer: 

Well, I love shows that take me out of the moment—but not too far out of the moment. My favorite pandemic show was Borgen. For your Scandinavian love, you’ll be excited by that. I could pretend I lived in Denmark in 2011 and think, "Everything’s great!"

I had actually never watched The West Wing.

[00:30:50] Sage Goodwin: 

No way. 

[00:30:51] Lily Geismer: 

Okay. I initially started watching it two years ago because I thought I was going to write something critical about its meanings. But then I just got really into it. I took a break, but in this moment, I’ve found watching The West Wing to be really nice. I can imagine I’m living in an Aaron Sorkin fantasy world. Do you watch it too?

[00:31:11] Julius Freeman: 

I just. They put it on Netflix, and so I started watching it. Yes. My nly struggle is that there are so many characters. 

[00:31:17] Lily Geismer: 

There are a lot of characters. 

[00:31:18] Julius Freeman: 

And so I'm trying to get invested in, I'm trying to find my character. 

[00:31:20] Lily Geismer: 

Oh, you'll get it. You get there and it just goes in and out. I found that to be nice; I can just pretend I’m in this weird utopian world.

[00:31:29] Julius Freeman: 

Yeah. 

[00:31:29] Lily Geismer: 

I will say this because I’ve spent a lot of time studying the Clintons; it’s just fascinating how far this current moment is from that moment. I find it interesting in that respect. So those are my shows, but I also watch a variety of others. I have no impulse control, so I’ll watch them really fast, and then I’m sad when they’re over. I recently watched Heated Rivalry, which I loved. I would recommend that to everyone, too.

[00:31:52] Sage Goodwin: 

Yeah. I also absolutely love that. And what you're talking about is the sort of despair you feel when it's over. 

[00:31:57] Lily Geismer: 

It’s sad. You get really invested. I think it’s fascinating to me how we consume things. I think watching a show when it’s released every week is a different experience. Now, we watch things in such concentrated ways that I actually think it isn't great. I think we should try to space things out, going back to serialized viewing rather than binging.

[00:32:29] Sage Goodwin: 

Rather than binging, exactly.

[00:32:31] Lily Geismer: 

Yes.

[00:32:32] Julius Freeman: 

Absolutely. We appreciate you so much for coming on and having this conversation with us. Before we go, where can our listeners find you and your work?

[00:32:42] Lily Geismer: 

I don’t have my own podcast, unfortunately, but I am a guest on several. You can Google me, Lily Geismer, to find my books. I also write a fair amount for different publications; most recently, I’ve written for The Nation, Boston Review, Dissent, and Jacobin. Those are good places to find me.

I also did two interviews with The Dig. So, if you didn’t feel you got enough here and you want to spend a lot of time hearing me talk, those are available for you.

[00:33:08] Sage Goodwin: 

We will absolutely put those in the show notes.

[00:33:09] Lily Geismer: 

I hope so! And the people who made The Big Dig did a show about the Massachusetts lottery, which is amazing. I’m in a whole episode of that. So, those are some other places you can look.

[00:33:22] Julius Freeman: 

So much to listen to, so much to watch. Where will it end?

[00:33:25] Lily Geismer: 

Exactly. 

[00:33:25] Julius Freeman: 

Yeah. We'll be set for a while. 

[00:33:27] Sage Goodwin: 

Well, yeah. Thank you so much for coming in and talking to us today. 

[00:33:30] Lily Geismer:

 Oh, it was my pleasure. Thank you so much for having me. 

[00:33:32] Sage Goodwin: 

Thank you.

[00:33:33] Julius Freeman: 

This has been another episode of Captivated. It's been hosted by a CAPT, you know, CAPTivated you. You guys get it. It's the Center for American Political History, Media, and Technology. 

[00:33:47] Hanna Sistek: 

The ideas presented by individuals on the podcast are theirs and theirs alone. They do not represent Purdue University, which adheres to policy of institutional neutrality. 

[00:34:01] Sage Goodwin: 

To learn more about this episode's guest, check out this show notes. We really enjoyed this conversation today, and we hope you got something out of it too. Thanks for listening. 


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Hanna Sistek

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Julius Freeman

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Sage Goodwin

Host